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SOUTHEY MEMORIAL LECTURE: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL ERA* 
Sir Robert and Lady Southey, members of the Southey family, Professor 
Crommelin, distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is an honour to join 
you today for the twentieth Allen Hope Southey Memorial Lecture. I intend to 
celebrate the memory of Allen Hope Southey by addressing the issue of constitu- 
tionalism in the global era. 
Constitutionalism is a legal theory that seeks to guarantee the liberty and rights 
of individuals under a limited government. For those who hold to a hard defini- 
tion of constitutionalism, this can be achieved only through the medium of a 
written constitution. For those who accept a soft approach to constitutionalism, a 
written document labelled 'constitution' is not absolutely necessary. A country 
with no written constitution may nevertheless adhere to constitutionalism. This is 
the case in Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In other words, what 
matters is the substance of constitutionalism, not the procedural aspects. As a 
matter of substance, constitutionalism is made of two fundamental principles: 
first, all powers derive from the people, and second, all people are endowed with 
fundamental human rights. Hence, the two basic principles of constitutionalism: 
democratic governance and respect for individual rights. I intend to discuss the 
impact of globalisation on these two basic principles. 
The term globalisation has now entered the vocabulary of laypeople. It is often 
used as a synonym for internationalisation. This is misleading because the two 
phenomena are not totally identical. Since the end of the nineteenth century, 
many political, economic or social matters have become 'internationalised' - 
that is, made subject to bi- or multinational cooperation between states. These 
matters have been internationalised by being regulated by treaties and conven- 
tions between states. The key issue is that treaties and conventions can only come 
into being through the free will of states. Accordingly, the distinctive feature of 
internationalisation is the fact that states succeeded in keeping the whole process 
under their control. 
Control by states seems to be lacking in the globalisation process. Today politi- 
cal, economic and social matters are globalised without states having any part in 
the process. Worse, in some cases, matters are globalised against the will of 
states. This is the case with serious threats to the environment such as ozone 
depletion or climate change. This is also the case with financial markets since the 
* Adapted from an Address to the Twentieth Biennial Allen Hope Southey Memorial Lecture, 
University of Melbourne, 13 August 1996. 
Professor of International and Comparative Law, UniversitC Pantheon-Assas (Paris II), Director 
of the American Law Centre. 
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movement of capital has become largely independent of the control of state 
agencies. 
Thus, there is a difference between internationalisation and globalisation. As 
opposed to internationalisation, globalisation has made national borders mean- 
ingless, if not obsolete. Here lies the major challenge of globalisation for 
constitutionalism because democracy and respect for individual rights need a 
place to grow. Both are territorially based. I will address the threats posed to 
constitutionalism by globalisation in two areas. Firstly, I will discuss democratic 
governance and the impact of market globalisation on the democratic decision- 
making process. Secondly, I will consider the impact of an increasing global 
culture on the rights of the individual. 
Democracy refers to a form of government in which the people rule. Actually, 
the people seldom rule directly. Participatory democracy is still an oddity in most 
Western states. These states adhere to the so-called liberal or representative 
democracy, which is a system of rule in which officers chosen by the citizens in 
free and regular elections make the decisions affecting the community. This 
system develops and ensures the idea of a 'national community of fate' - a 
community that rightly governs itself and determines its own future. Globalisa- 
tion of markets has brought two major challenges to this institutional scheme. 
The first concerns the decision-making process of constitutional democracies; the 
second relates to the future of government in market-oriented societies. 
In terms of the democratic decision-making process, representative democracy 
remained meaningful as long as politics managed to keep the market society 
under control. The job of the liberal democracy was indeed to uphold the market 
society by regulating competition between economic actors. This worked well 
when the boundaries of states marked out the territory - a 'place' - within 
which law prevailed. 
It is important at this point to recall that with the coming into being of democ- 
racy, law's first claim became spatial or territorial, in contradistinction to the 
feudal system in which law's basic claim was personal - that is, attached to the 
individual, not the territory or the 'place'. It was left to the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment to demonstrate that there is no liberty where the governed are 
subject to legal commands due to their status or their act of birth. In so far as 
people cannot be free if they are subject to a law that they have not freely 
consented to, it is necessary to break the link between the person and the law by 
making everyone equal before the law and by giving everyone a chance to 
participate even indirectly in the law-making process. Thus a territory - or a 
'place' - is of primary importance for the constitutional democracy to work out 
in a meaningful way. Democracy begins with drawing the limits of the constitu- 
ency. Therefore, it necessarily implies borders which actually realise the adequa- 
tion between the market place and the polity. 
With the globalisation of markets, the place of the polity and the place of the 
market no longer coincide. This means, on the one hand, that the marketplace is 
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out of reach of the decisions of the polity and, on the other, that the polity is 
subject to decisions in which its elected officers have taken no part. Under such 
circumstances the idea of a 'national community of fate' becomes an empty 
phrase. In order to get out of this quagmire, global markets have to be regulated 
in such a way that constitutional democracies can again pretend to be in charge of 
their own destiny. 
Market regulation can be achieved, first, by international cooperation between 
states and, in particular, through appropriate treaty-making. A second option - 
more ambitious, but perhaps more efficient - is to set up, above states, institu- 
tional arrangements that will reproduce the constitutional decision-making 
process existing below. From a practical standpoint, it could be said that the first 
option has been the choice made by the Contracting Parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) when they transformed their organisa- 
tion into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The second option is the choice 
made by the European states when they created the European Economic Comrnu- 
nity (EEC) which subsequently became the European Union (EU). In terms of 
market regulation, the difference between the two options is huge. Whereas the 
world market is hardly regulated at all, the European market is the only one that 
provides for some kind of control by the state. 
Where does that lead us? Simply to this: international arrangements must be 
subject to the critical test of constitutional democracy, if one is serious about 
bringing under better control the pressing problems that today escape the control 
of the state. This is no easy task as the painful discussions on the new institutions 
of the EU currently underway have already demonstrated. 
On the other hand, democratic control over global markets cannot be achieved 
without some transfers of sovereign competencies. Sooner or later, the upward 
movement of political and economic powers raises the question of what will 
remain within the jurisdiction of the states. European states have tried to solve 
the dilemma by having recourse to the concept of 'subsidiarity'.' In a nutshell, 
the Community shall take action only if, and in so far as, the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. On its 
face the idea is very appealing, but it really works only for the policies that are 
divisible. In a world of global interconnectedness such policies are not numerous: 
culture, artistic activities and possibly education are cases in point. 
The second challenge brought by the global markets for the system of constitu- 
tional democracy relates to the size and the functions of government. No one 
today is untouched by the power of government. Its impact on our daily life and 
work is impressive. Twentieth century governments have been called upon to 
Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union (1992) 31 ILM 247, 258-9 reads as follows: 
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and 
of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive compe- 
tence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
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regulate a welfare state and manage the economy, to foster industrial develop- 
ment and protect the environment. They concern themselves with national 
education, artistic activities, consumer protection, energy protection, equal pay 
for men and women and restrictive trade practices. The growth of governmental 
power has followed inevitably from the increase in the tasks of government and 
has been stimulated by the demands of social justice and public welfare. In 
carrying out their increased commitments, governments have grown into huge 
bureaucracies providing work for thousands of civil servants and dependence for 
an even more impressive number of people. The question is whether these large 
bureaucracies will survive in market-oriented societies. 
Against a backdrop of increasing global competition for markets and invest- 
ment, constitutional democracies seem to be torn apart between two contradictory 
requirements. On the one hand, if it is true that globalisation necessarily entails 
downsizing, the era of 'big government' - in American parlance - is over. In 
the same manner that globalisation has generated a new organisational form of 
business in the private sector, known as the 'hollow corporation', it could 
generate in the public domain what might be called a 'hollow ~ t a t e ' . ~  The 
metaphor describes the intense effort made by the Thatcher cabinet in Great 
Britain and the Reagan and Bush administrations in the US to privatise public 
services. In some domains, such as delivery of health and human services which 
used to be performed by public agencies, governments have increasingly con- 
tracted out with private non-profit and for-profit agencies. Advocates of privati- 
sation are right in making the point that government can provide, or arrange for 
citizens to receive, a service without government actually producing it. But there 
are limits in downsizing government. In contradistinction to what happened in the 
private sector, a 'hollow state' that consists of a lean headquarters with only four 
departments such as defence, justice, home affairs and foreign affairs, is unlikely 
and truly impossible. 
There is indeed no possible return to nineteenth century governments. Globali- 
sation of markets has generated huge social disruption that calls for even more 
welfare. This sad result, particularly in Europe, is a rather ironic lesson for the 
hard liberals who believed that the globalisation of markets would necessarily 
pave the way to a new economic Eden. Doubts may be cast as to the possibility 
of a disappearance of the welfare state. Instead of withering away, the welfare 
state will more likely be reallocated or redistributed to local government. 
However, globalisation of markets has also taken place in a context of fierce 
competition for attraction and retention of jobs and a high level of economic 
prosperity within the borders of the state. Major corporations and big multina- 
tionals do not enter this competition alone as, say, noble knights in a tournament 
of the Middle Ages. More often than not, these national firms are the champions 
of states. National administrations put their full weight behind the firm's efforts 
to win significant contracts abroad. 
H Milward and Keith Provan, 'The Hollow State: Private Provision of Public Services' in Helen 
Ingram and Steven Smith (eds), Public Policy for Democracy (1993) 222-37. 
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Accordingly, the relation between government and the market has changed. 
Acl:ually, the transformation had already begun with the national market. What 
happened at the global level is only a continuation of a heavy trend in the new 
configuration of the state. The decisive factor is that government is not out of the 
market; rather, government uses the market and the market forces to more 
efficiently further collective, public interest goals. A fundamental feature of the 
constitutional state, the distinction between the public and the private sector, the 
political and the civil society, is diminishing. Government is everywhere, with 
everyone, all the time. In order to describe this pervasive omnipresence of the 
state in society, political scientists and constitutional lawyers tend to refer to the 
concept of governance. As the Report of the National Performance Review 
prepared in the United States by Vice-President Gore put it: 'Governance means 
setting priorities, then using the federal government's immense power to steer 
what happens in the private ~ e c t o r . ' ~  This is very far from what constitutionalism 
taught us in terms of government. A limited government was indeed the raison 
d'gtre of the constitutionalist ideology, for this was the best way to protect our 
individual rights. 
11 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS A N D  THE GLOBAL CULTURE 
By global culture, we might refer to the increasing similarities that seem to 
bring together beliefs, sentiments and creeds all over the world. A single set of 
subjective attitudes and mental representations is progressively taking place. 
With the end of the cold war, the phenomenon has been particularly striking in 
the field of political culture. As a concomitant of the globalisation of markets, 
there has been some movement towards a relatively uniform constitutional law. 
This is the case with two basic tenets of constitutionalism: respect for human 
rights and judicial review. Both institutions appear to be singularly successful and 
serve as world models. Does this mean that individual rights may now be 
considered as universal, regardless of the political culture of the countries 
concerned? I will address this question by analysing the impact of globalisation, 
first, on the content of individual rights and, second, on their constitutional 
guarantee by judicial review. 
The growth in international concern for human rights has been especially 
dramatic since the end of World War 11. Initially, the movement was launched as 
a revolt against the barbarities that had been practiced by the Nazis. Subse- 
quently, it grew in importance as the totalitarian practices of the communist states 
were made public. In many respects, this movement may be regarded as a victory 
for constitutionalism. However, it should be pointed out that there has always 
been some ambiguity as to the exact content of the individual rights that ought to 
be placed 'above all sovereignty'. In 1948, the United Nations (UN) spelled out 
what was meant by 'human rights' in the Universal Declaration of Human 
A1 Gore, Report of the National Performance Review - From Red Tape to Results: Creating a 
Government that Works Better and Costs Less (1993) 62.  
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Righk4 The Declaration was adopted without dissent, but with abstentions by the 
Soviet bloc nations, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia. 
From a legal viewpoint, the Declaration was not considered as a legally binding 
instrument, in so far as the rights enumerated therein had to be codified in a full- 
fledged international treaty. In the subsequent years, while the Cold War was 
under way, the controversy that had already arisen between East and West during 
the elaboration of the Declaration, as to the content of human rights, became 
more acute. Soviet bloc nations contended that the civil and political rights of the 
West were merely virtual, as opposed to the economic and social rights that ought 
to be considered as truly real. As it proved impossible to reconcile the two 
approaches, the UN committee that was in charge of codifying human rights had 
no other option than to prepare two drafts, one on the political and civil rights, 
the other on the economic, social and cultural rights. This is why the UN adopted 
in 1966 two separate covenants: the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights5 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
 right^,^ both adopted on 16 December 1966. 
The revolutions that swept Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 have not made 
a reconciliation between the two approaches easier. The view that economic and 
social questions should be thought of in terms of rights has survived the demise 
of the communist empire. Moreover, human rights activists in a number of Third 
World countries, especially in Asia, have long held the view that economic and 
social rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights, on the other, are not 
severable. Last, but not least, one may wonder whether a new dividing line is not 
taking place between Europe and America as it seems increasingly obvious that 
Europeans, in contradistinction with Americans, do not take economic and social 
rights lightly. The fact remains that a global and comprehensive approach to 
human rights is out of reach. 
Differences in national approaches to human rights have worsened in the post- 
Cold War era. Against a backdrop of postmodernity, doubts have been cast on the 
ideal of universality that pervades the discourse on human rights. The questioning 
of universalism originates in a body of thought and sensibility known as 
'postmodernism'. The postmodern political and social thought emanates from 
France, where it developed in the aftermath of the Parisian uprising of 1968. 
Postmodernists questioned the whole paradigm of human rights. As France was 
approaching the Bicentenary of 1789, postmodern attacks were launched against 
the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights. Before long, the postmod- 
ern intellectuals displayed a ferocious contempt for the Enlightenment, for the 
Revolution, for humanism and for the idea of human rights. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A, 3 UN GAOR (183rd plen mtg), UN Doc 
NRes1217A (1948). 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966,993 UNTS 3 . 6  ILM 360 (entered into force 1976). 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368 (entered into force generally 1976, entered into force for Australia 
1980). 
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Rejecting the traditional individualistic approach to human rights, postmodern 
scholars claim that the Western idea of human rights is wrong because it dis- 
counts the differences between people, which they consider more important. The 
human differences most interesting to them are sedgender and racelethnicity. In 
terms of practical activities, they focus almost wholly on causes and groups. 
Instead of individual rights, they favour group rights. For example, they fight 
oppression and injustice against women, homosexuals and people of colour. 
The impact of the postmodernist discourse on constitutionalism is difficult to 
assess. True, the ideal of universality prevailed in Prague when demonstrators 
went up against armed Soviet troops, bearing signs that said 'Truth will prevail', 
or when students in Beijing died with 'We shall overcome' on their shirts. But 
relativism has already greatly influenced some domestic policies on human 
rights. A case in point is the United States where, by virtue of laws requiring or 
permitting racial segregation, individual rights must in certain cases yield to 
group rights. Interestingly, in those states that provide for constitutional guaran- 
tees of individual rights, the chances are that constitutional courts will eventually 
be the ultimate arbiter between the two approaches. 
Perhaps the coming into being of a global constitutional culture is clearest and 
most dramatic in the fervour for judicial review. The spread of constitutional 
courts and constitutional judicial review in this fin de sitcle seems to have been 
irresistible. The movement began after World War I1 when new constitutions with 
bills of rights and judicial review appeared in Italy7 and in germ an^.^ Subse- 
quently, Greece9 and Spainlo followed suit. More recently, the transmuted 
Eastern European states have adopted bills of rights and constitutional judicial 
review almost automatically, as if a constitutional court was a certificate for real, 
true, authentic democracy. Even more notably, countries whose political and legal 
tradition has been most resistant to constitutional judicial review now find 
themselves more or less compelled to swim with the current. This is the case with 
France whose originally modest Constitutional C ~ u n c i l ' ~  has turned itself into a 
constitutional court with human rights jurisdiction. 
Against the enthusiasm for constitutional judicial review, there are, it is true, 
some resistances. This is true in the case of Great Britain whose bedrock princi- 
ple of parliamentary sovereignty still holds good, amid mounting criticism from 
the judicial review doctrine and the left because of the drawbacks of this princi- 
ple when human rights come into play. This is also the case in the Netherlands, 
where the constitution provides that courts may not review the constitutionality of 
laws.I2 
However, the Dutch situation departs from the British tradition on a major 
point. The Dutch constitution provides that treaties have priority over domestic 
Constitution of Italy (1948) art 134. 
* Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) art 93. 
Constitution of Greece (1975) art 93(4). 
lo Constitution of Spain (1978) art 162. 
l 1  Constitution of France (1958) Title VII, arts 56-63. 
l 2  Constitution of the Netherlands (1991) art 120. 
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laws.I3 This obliges the courts to verify whether the legislation is in conformity 
with treaty law and, in particular, whether the statute conforms to the European 
Convention on Human Rights,I4 which is binding on all European States. For all 
practical purposes, this means that rules of human rights treaties play in the 
Dutch legal order the same role as a bill of rights that is judicially enforceable. A 
statute which infringes human rights may not, and will not, be applied in The 
Netherlands legal order. Therefore, although explicitly deprived from the power 
of constitutional judicial review, Dutch courts nevertheless reach the same result 
by refusing to apply domestic laws on the ground that they are contrary to a 
treaty. 
A similar result has been attained in France. Like their Dutch counterparts, but 
without specific constitutional provisions, French courts consider themselves as 
precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of statutes. Nonetheless, in so far 
as they now enforce Article 55 of the Con~titution'~ which gives priority to 
treaties over statutes, French courts are actually in a position to apply to statutes a 
test of conformity with human rights requirements that is as stringent, if not more 
so, than a traditional test of constitutionality would be. Notwithstanding their lack 
of constitutional judicial review, Dutch and French courts do possess 
'conventional' judicial review because they are in a position to enforce the 
European Convention on Human Rights against their respective parliaments. 
Their experience is instructive for all the countries that abide by the European 
parliamentary tradition that rules out constitutional judicial review. 
It may well be that this European parliamentary tradition rests on more solid 
ground than the advocates of constitutional judicial review seem to believe. 
Globalisation of constitutional judicial review would not advance the cause of 
constitutionalism as much as its strongest defenders believe. The reason is that 
amending the constitution in unitary states is usually not as difficult as in federal 
states. Therefore, whenever a constitutional court declares a statute contrary to 
the constitution, it may not take too long for it to be overruled by the pouvoir 
constituant - that is, the sovereign. This is what happened in France in respect 
of the right of asylum after the Constitutional Council had declared that it could 
not be restricted by way of treaty. Less than three months after the ruling by the 
Constitutional Council, the constitution was amended to authorise derogations to 
the right of asylum.16 Doubts may be cast as to whether this was a victory for 
judicial constitutional review. 
l 3  Ibid art 94. 
l4  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
UNTS 221 (entered into force 1953). 
l 5  Article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 provides: 'From their publication, duly ratified or 
approved treaties or agreements have a higher authority than lois, subject, for each treaty or 
agreement, to its implementation by the other party' in John Bell, French Constitutional Law 
(1992) 257. 
Ibid art 53.1. 
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Constitutionalism is now part of our common constitutional heritage. Without 
it, it is doubtful that we would have attained the degree of liberty that we now 
enjoy in our respective states. True, in some cases, progress needs to be made 
and it is tempting to call for more globalisation. However, one should be careful 
in importing constitutional devices. There is no such thing as a 'one size fits all' 
in constitutional law. Constitutional rules have to be tailored to each country. 
However, regardless of the necessary adjustments, one should never forget that 
the fabric of constitutionalism is always the same. Constitutionalism has been 
devised for the good and the right of humankind. As globalisation of markets 
may put globalisation of constitutional law at risk because of its huge social 
costs, we must never forget that the starting point and the end result of constitu- 
tionalism is indeed the human being. 
